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The Language of Russian Political Discourse 
and National Myth
One of the specific historical and cultural characteristics of the Russian po­
litical discourse is its orientation to precedents. It is considered correct to 
follow the behaviouristic models shown by one of the “heroes” (Peter I, 
Lenin, Stalin, etc.), to reproduce standard texts, and to compare the present 
situations with past situations (The Time of Troubles, Weimar Republic, 
NEP “New Economic Policy” (1921-1928), etc.). One of the peculiarities of 
the present time in Russia is the deep conflict between different social 
groups orientated to different precedents. Each group has its own variant of 
the national myth using the same means of the language for actualisation 
of this myth. Therefore, it is very important to analyse changes in the na­
tional cognitive foundation. Precedential phenomena are the central compo­
nents o f this foundation.
By the cognitive foundation, we mean a special combination o f knowledge, 
notions, and presentations that is known to the majority of members o f the 
lingua-cultural society. During the last years, we can observe the numerous 
attacks to this foundation. This causes serious changes in the foundation and 
is reflected by the usage of the words denoting the elements o f this founda­
tion (for example, JlemiH ‘Lenin’ and its derivatives no-jiemiHCKU, jienuH- 
c k u u  ‘lenin-like, in the style of Lenin’, etc.).
The destruction of broad areas o f the Russian cognitive foundation deter­
mines the necessity o f restoring it and introducing new text-precedents, 
name-precedents, and situation-precedents into it. The contemporary Russian 
political discourse provides numerous examples of the stmggle for the pre­
cedential phenomena. Some of these examples are presented in our scientific 
report.
We will place emphasis on the use o f name-precedents (PN). By name- 
precedents, we understand a specific group of proper nouns relating to either
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1) a widely known text, which as a rule belongs to text-precedents (such as 
the proper names Mitrofanushka, Khlestakov) or
2) a situation commonly known to native speakers which appears as a 
precedent one (Ivan Susanin, Judas). The use of PN actualises the nation­
ally determined, minimised notion implied by the name. We will permit 
ourselves to refer to a very striking example used more than once in our 
previous papers:
At the 1993 parliamentary election, the Democratic Choice o f  Russia move­
ment adopted the Bronze Horseman image as its emblem: In the minds of the 
electorate o f the election programme within this political movement, it was 
most likely to be associated with the reign o f Peter the Great. Visual and 
verbal advertisements of the movement contained numerous references and 
allusions to the Emperor. The example under consideration obviously ap­
peals to the minimised concept o f Peter the Great, the notion stored in the 
cognitive base after which the ruler is perceived as the Tsar-Reformer who 
converted Russia into a world power in the shortest time. It is notable that 
Russia's Choice presented the programme that may be described as liberal- 
bourgeois: The programme proclaimed the protection of human rights, eco­
nomic, political, and spiritual personal liberty, and so on. At the same time, 
members of this political movement were not in the least troubled by the fact 
that the man to whom they appealed had never been a man described as a 
democrat, marketist, or protector o f human rights. He was, quite the con­
trary, one o f the most despotic rulers in the world who never took into ac­
count individual interests and who roughly violated their rights in every as­
pect. This paradox, however, was overlooked by both the Russia's Choice 
followers and opponents: The movement replicating Peter's image referred 
not to a real historical person with a set o f rather conflicting characteristics 
but to a highly reduced idea of this tsar adopted by the linguo-cultural com­
munity.
Political discourse, by definition, is suggestive. Suggestion very rarely ap­
peals to rationale: It is much more effective when it appeals to the concepts 
with a powerful connotative supply. An experienced politician (in particular, 
a collective politician, such as newspaper, TV channel, etc.) involved in the 
leader-masses' communication is forced directly or indirectly to operate the 
key concepts o f the national culture {power, conscience, patriotism, honour,
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spirituality, etc. -  all these are the key concepts in Russian culture). This is 
the case provided that he appeals not to the logic o f the concept implied by 
the above words but instead to certain images and notions that provide reifi­
cation of rather complex and differently understood concepts. The name- 
precedents are denotations of these notions, which are the concrete realisa­
tion o f abstract concepts. Thus, Nikita Mikhalkov, full o f  presidential preten­
sions, obviously avoided the use o f abstract names when he appeared on TV 
(TEMA programme, ORT Channel, 12 December 1998) and, more than once, 
resorted to the name-precedents (Alexander Nevsky, Tolstoy, Dostoevsky, 
Stolypin, Sergiy Radonezhsky, etc.), which became a key map of his political 
position. And vice versa, Egor Gaidar's appeals to rational discourse reason­
ing, his logically irreproachable syllogisms, and many abstract notions dur­
ing TV debates had little force. Therefore, the name-precedents represent in a 
sense the concrete realisation of the key national cultural concepts due to 
their suggestive potential that is much more powerful than that of the names 
denoting such concepts. This is dictated by the above mentioned expressive­
ness and axiologism of the name-precedents.
The utterance which may be referred to political discourse is always ad­
dressed to the masses and not to individuals, whether it is a newspaper re­
port, political speech, or even a remark of an interviewee, expressly ad­
dressed to the concrete individual but implicitly catering to a wider audience. 
In this event, the communicants operate a reduced number of stereotypes 
that bring the variety of dialectical characteristics o f some “cultural object” 
to a rigid set o f several features o f the latter. Due to their peculiar properties, 
the name-precedents provide the best fit for active functioning in this type of 
communication.
The above mentioned specificity of the use o f the units in question is quite 
vividly manifested in the analysis of aggregate texts o f the mass media: 
These are renowned for their pronounced, political convictions (it will be 
quite difficult to find a different one in today's Russia, though). In addition, 
the newspaper interprets itself as a collective leader of the masses (“ ... not 
only a collective propagandist and agitator; but also a collective organiser”). 
Thus, if  one looks through the reports in Zavtra, the Russian weekly, one 
will easily discover that the names o f Kolovrat, Zhukov, Alexander Matro­
sov, Kutuzov, and the like, that is, those regarding the idea of sacrificial bat­
tle with an external enemy for the sake of fatherland liberation, are the most
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common name-precedents. Among name-precedents, the names that actual- 
ise the notion o f the Kulikovo battle, which is a precedential situation for 
Russians, are rather frequent: Where are you, successors o f  Peresvet and 
Osliabia? All these years, the Russian architecture waited its time like Bo- 
brok. Who is he, new Sergiy, to give us battle blessing?, and the like. The 
passage below from an article by Kuniaev, where the author reminisces 
about his fraught with the danger in the struggle against Jewish dominance 
during the Brezhnev era, is rather illustrative. The author had already com­
posed a letter on the subject and was going to place it before the Communist 
Party Central Committee despite the innumerable troubles he foresaw in the 
future. Finally, Kuniaev overcame his fears and sent a letter. He writes “/  
knew, that the Nepriadva had been crossed and bridges had been burnt." It 
is notable that the native Russian Nepriadva was crossed instead of the alien 
Rubicon; the author uses this very name despite its rather lower “preceden­
tial status” in the Russian linguo-cultural community as compared with that 
of the Rubicon. That is quite in the order o f things, since these hydronyms 
relate to the absolutely different situation-precedents and the proper name 
Nepriadva is called to actualise the notion of the Kulikovo battle, the fierce 
life-and-death fight against alien and infidel invaders. The author perceives 
himself as a warrior of Saint Dmitry Donskoy fighting against the enemy 
hordes. So, one may easily note the global comparison and even equation of 
the actualised situation-precedent with the actual speech situation, such 
comparison being purposely extralogical and non-discoursive. It should be 
noted, that comicality in the texts of this sort only a stranger may be caught 
in the universe o f the underlying myth, that is, by one who belongs to any 
other myth (the democratic one, for example).
The latter example deals with the actualisation through the name-precedents 
of the myth adopted by a certain social community but not, of course, by the 
nation as a whole. Today we witness an attempt (it does not matter, deliber­
ate or not) to create new and restore old structures o f the national cognitive 
base in place o f those transformed or destructed. Under the pretence of the 
role o f collective leaders, newspapers try to structure certain notions, which 
refer to certain myths. In the circumstances o f global polarisation, each party 
pretends to own the national invariant o f “true” notion implied by a name- 
precedent, the only true mythology, condemning all those that do not match 
it as heresy and schemes of enemies (of the Fatherland, democracy, human 
rights, etc.). The operations with the name-precedents, which are quite ap­
parent in the Russian political discourse, vividly illustrate this struggle for 
the national myth.
References
Bazylev, Vladimir N. (1997): Russian Political Discourse (from official to ordinary). 
In: Political Discourse in Russia. Moscow; p. 7-13. [Ea3biJieB, BjiaflH M up H.
(1997): P occhhckhS nojnm raecK H fi ¿wcKypc (o t ocJwuHajibHoro ao o6tm eH - 
Horo) // IIOJlHTHHeCKHfi flHCKypC b Pocchh. MocKBa. C. 7-13.]
Krasnykh, Victoria V. (1998): Virtual Reality or Real Virtuality? M oscow . [Kpac- 
Hbix, B hktopim B. (1998): BnpTyajibHaa peajibHOCTt hjih peantHaa BHpTyajib- 
HOCTb? MocKBa.]
Sheigal, Elena I. (2000): Semiotics of Political Discourse. Moscow-Volgograd. 
[IUeftraji, EjieHa H. (2000): CeMHOTHKa nojiHTiraecKoro aucKypca. MocKBa- 
Bojirorpaa.]
Sorokin, Yurij A. (2000): Status o f Fact and Evalution in Mass Media Texts. In: 
Political Discourse in Russia -  4. Moscow; p. 89-101. [CopoKHH, KDpufi A. 
(2000): CTaTyc 4>aKTa h ouchkh b TeKCTax MaccoBoii KOMMyHHKauHH // FIojih- 
THHeCKHii flHCKypC B P occhh  -  4. MocKBa. C. 89-101.]
The Language o f  Russian Political Discourse and National Myth 125

